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Abstract: It is well known that oil price shocks are a major concern to the health of the global 
economy. Unstable oil prices have a significant negative impact on consumer confidence and 
business decision making. As a result economic recovery may be longer and more 
complicated. Controlling the global oil price may not be possible, but a main concern of this 
research relates to energy market efficiency and as to whether relative price differences 
respond in an appropriate way across the region of one country. Here, the different 
geographic areas of a country are analysed to see whether they belong to the same market and 
result in the relative prices being stationary. The gasoline market in different regions of the 
US is analyzed. It is believed that if the gasoline market is sufficiently active in the US, then 
as a result of arbitrage, long-run gasoline prices by region should follow each other. In an 
efficient market, a price shock in one region would be reflected in all other prices. This 
proposition is tested in an effective manner by a barrage of stationarity tests. This is pertinent 
as such tests have been applied in antitrust cases in Italy and the Netherlands to determine 
whether there might be market imperfections or in association with more heuristic 
information, possible collusion. 
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1- INTRODUCTION 
 
Oil prices are currently of particular concern for the health of the global economy, oil price 
anomalies are likely to harm consumer confidence and business decision making. It has been 
suggested recently that oil prices have shifted from the control of OPEC to the global market 
for oil and as a result in recent times it can be viewed as being less susceptible to political 
intervention. 
It may be possible to determine whether the market is efficient and this can be 
observed via the finding of arbitrage in the long-run. According to the US Energy Information 
Administration (EIA) report (2007), US refineries produced over 90% of the gasoline used in 
the US, but less than 40% of the crude oil used to produce the gasoline comes from the US. 
Much of the gasoline produced in the US approximately 45% comes from refineries 
on the Gulf Coast (including Texas and Louisiana). However, a number of factors could cause 
gasoline price variations across regions of a country like the US: tax differentials; the cost of 
crude oil; refining costs and profits; distribution and marketing costs and profits; distance 
from supplier; supply disturbances; retail competition; environmental programs. So where 
fuel is produced and how it is distributed, may have a significant effect on the price of 
gasoline sold to the consumer. The focus of attention here is to evaluate whether the market 
for petroleum products is efficient in a long-run sense and this occurs by determining the 
extent to which relative prices can be differ across the regions of one country. 
[Figure 1 goes here] 
Figure 1 shows the distribution of gasoline taxes across the United States that is combined 
local, state and federal. Red areas indicate high tax levels (greater than 47.70 cents per gallon) 
on gasoline, yellow areas medium tax levels (between 40 and 47.70 cents per gallon) and blue 
areas signify lower taxes (less than 40 cents per gallon). The US average tax level for gasoline 
is 47.70 cents per gallon. Unless there is a trend in tax differentials then these discrepancies 
ought not to affect the long-run and short-run effects that are stable ought to be captured by 
the intercept in the model. 
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This research is primarily empirical and econometric with the innovation relating to 
the methods applied to detect what was termed by Forni (2004) in the context of regional milk 
prices in Italy “a broad market”. The study of Forni was applied to the price of a homogenous 
product over time to determine the dimension of either the product or the geographic market 
and advise the regulatory authorities over the merits of further concentration in the industry 
(Lexecon, 2001). Price data have been analysed in a similar way using panel methods by 
Giulietti et al (2010) to determine anti-competitive behaviour for energy markets in the UK. 
An alternative way of analysing the market for gasoline is as a commodity and 
instead of viewing that as an issue related to competition we might consider the observation 
of arbitrage as a sign of informational rather than product market efficiency. When a market 
is efficient in an informational sense, then price signals that impact the market will give rise 
to price movements that will lead to the removal of mispricing. In a commodity market, prices 
adjust to eliminate mispricing and this implies that there is arbitrage across prices at least in 
the long-run or that we find long-run arbitrage correction. 
Why should gasoline prices be dissimilar in different geographic areas in the US? 
Does this mean the energy market is not efficient and how can it be made more efficient? If 
the market is efficient, oil prices in different regions of a country should follow each other. 
When price behaviour alone is observed, then the shocks respond to factors that affect both 
demand and supply across the industry and when all firms respond to these movements then 
the market should be efficient in the long-run. Here price shocks in one region of the US are 
expected to impact all the other prices. No suggestion is being made that arbitrage applies in 
the short-run, though it ought to be noticed that the structure of the Dickey Fuller test model 
imposes a common factor restriction (Hendry and Mizon, 1978) that forces the long and 
short-run responses to be the same and that means here that the market is efficient (Burke and 
Hunter, 2005, Chapter 3). One conclusion of the observation of inefficiency would be that 
there is collusion and this was made by London Economics (2002) in their study for Dutch 
regulator of the Netherlands mobile telecommunications market. 
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Next this article considers the literature, then the methodology and then the results are 
analysed. Finally our conclusions are offered. 
2- REVIEW OF ESSENTIAL LITERATURE 
Considering the differences in taxes seen in plot 1, the gasoline prices are not exactly the 
same across regions of the US, but in a market that is informationally efficient then price 
shocks in one region should be reacted to another region as a result of arbitrage. Burke and 
Hunter (2011) show that when a price in one market reacts to a long-run equilibrium price 
target (LEPT), then this corresponds to all prices in the market responding in proportion or 
what has been termed parallel pricing by Buccirossi (2006). Gasoline is a relatively 
homogenous product and in this paper we evaluate such prices without considering 
technological differences across primary gasoline outlets across the United States.  
The proposition that underlines the idea that the market is efficient is that all prices 
fully reflect all information across the system. One might consider the possibility of 
anomalies in the short-run, but in the long-run minor differences ought to be smoothed out. 
Hence one would anticipate prices should respond to the stochastic behaviour that underlines 
prices that operate in the market and this behaviour is summarized by a stochastic trend. 
Some of the early literature on the nature of collusive behaviour suggested this would 
be indicated by strong correlations between prices (Maunder, 1972). Such price 
correspondence was seen as a signal of pricing decisions being made in concert and this 
would be suggestive of collusion especially with imperfect competition. Posner (1976) 
considered current price as a key factor in estimating the impact of mergers. A key aim of the 
most competition agencies is to recognize an active monopoly or detect collusion. To this 
end, an Antitrust Agency’s target is to avoid creating a new firm with the potential to exert 
market power and increase the over-all price level in the market.  
The emphasis has changed more recently as the similarity of price movements can 
also be considered as a signal of an effectively functioning market. The market efficiency 
proposition implies that commodity prices ought to fully reflect all information, while the 
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associated concept of arbitrage suggests that prices of the same good are likely to move 
together. Stigler and Sherwin (1985) suggested that products be grouped in a single market 
when prices move together and that gives support to price co-movement being linked to 
efficiency when a market is categorized by homogenous products. Furthermore in a 
theoretical setting Buccirossi (2006) has made the observation that price setting being 
independent is not necessarily consistent with behaviour that can be objectively described as 
collusive. Buccirossi finds in a short-run sense, price responses may be different from unity 
and in certain types of model this behaviour may not be inconsistent with price competition. 
Empirically, a range of econometric and time series methods  have been proposed to 
analyse the time series properties of price series to indicate anti-competitive behaviour (see, 
Horowitz, 1981, Slade, 1986, and Uri, Howell, and Rifkin, 1985). A review of quantitative 
methods applied to the analysis of competition cases was prepared by LecG (1999) for the 
United Kingdom Office of Fair Trading (OFT). The LecG report points out that causality and 
correlation may need to be used in concert to distinguish between competitive and non-
competitive behaviour. Further, the need to consider the notion of non-stationarity is 
emphasised in relation to a modern treatment and as a result distinguish between the long and 
the short-run. 
The argument used in Buccirossi (2006) suggests that it is not conclusive in a short-
run sense that prices ought to move in parallel that leads to the conclusion that this can only 
be considered a long-run property. It would also seem easier to frame a legal argument in the 
context of long-run behaviour as short-run pricing anomalies may be seen less as the result of 
aggressive price leadership (Markham, 1951) and more likely as a result of arbitrage or at 
most be indicative of barometric pricing (Koutsyiannis, 1975).  
This leads Forni (2004) to argue that if two product or geographic areas belong in the 
same market for the purposes of antitrust legislation, their relative log price ratio must be 
stationary. Hence, stationarity tests such as the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test and 
KPSS test can be useful in describing the related nature of markets. If one considers the non-
stationarity of the log of the price ratio, then this is indicative of the distinct nature of a 
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geographic market. Testing whether price proportions are stationary can be seen as a 
technically efficient way of determining whether prices cointegrate where the proportionality 
of prices is imposed by the structure of the stationarity/non-stationarity test. Forni considers it 
to have significant advantages to methods that on one hand consider the elasticity of the 
residual demand function and on the other cointegration. The test implies that each price 
within a well defined product market captures a component of the non-stationarity that arises 
from the stochastic trend driving underlying behaviour. Hence, price proportions in an 
effectively functioning market ought to be stationary. Forni (2004) mentions that this analysis 
links strongly with the literature on testing stationarity of the real exchange rate, and Beirne, 
Hunter and Simpson (2007) consider a joint analysis using univariate and panel methods. 
Forni (2004) defined the notion of what he termed a broad market definition to 
characterise market efficiency in relation to a highly homogenous product, milk. Pricing 
behaviour across Italy is only limited by one significant natural physical break related to the 
Straits of Messina lying between Calabria/Puglia and Sicily. With the exception of regulation 
that forces milk sales to be limited to four days from production and suggests some constraint 
on sales between the far north and south of the country little else ought to limit arbitrage. 
Burke and Hunter (2011) consider the idea of long-run equilibrium price targeting 
(LEPT) to describe the price setting behaviour of firms. If prices in a market are driven by 
arbitrage, then subject to the existence of an appropriate number of long-run relations, then 
arbitrage is consistent with firms following LEPT. In the context of firm specific prices as 
arose in the analysis of the Dutch market for mobile termination charges by London 
Economics (2002), then it is in principle possible to further distinguish between parallel 
pricing and aggressive price leadership when one of a sequence of prices is weakly exogenous 
(Hunter and Burke, 2007, and Kurita, 2008). In terms of the market data analysed here, weak 
exogeneity implies that the price process in the other regions may be driven by the weakly 
exogenous price. However, this price can only be tied down to a single company via the 
ownership of the refining capacity as compared with oil production. 
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In the gasoline market it is suggested that the existence of refiners in a region can 
create differences in price levels. Hence, a further concern of this research is not the existence 
of such differences but the stability of price relations over time. It is suggested that the price 
of gasoline in different geographic areas of the same market, should not be different from 
each other in the long run otherwise there is an arbitrage opportunity. The supporting 
argument is the statistical concept of stationarity as applied to price proportions.  
As was stated above testing stationarity of price proportions is an inferentially 
effective way to test for cointegration between log prices and when these series are stationary 
then the result is consistent with long-run arbitrage. This is especially pertinent when as is the 
case for Forni (2004) and London Economics (2002) the time series sample is small. Here this 
approach is followed, but unlike Forni we limit ourselves to a subset of price proportions. 
First the upper triangle of stationarity tests for equations for which the lag order has been 
securely selected ought to be the same as the reverse calculation associated with the lower 
triangle.
1
 Second, the stationarity tests impose a restriction that implies that arbitrage is 
imposed to the short and the long-run as the variable tested is a price proportion and this is the 
dependent variable in the stationarity tests (ADF or KPSS). This implies that a sequence of 
restricted dynamic models is being estimated that correspond with the stationarity tests of 
price proportions, but this calls into question the number of coherent price models that might 
be computed. A similar problem arises when the real exchange rate is tested for stationarity 
using cross rates (Smith and Hunter, 1985, and Hunter and Simpson, 2004). This implies that 
there is a limit to the number of dynamic price models related to a fixed number of single 
equation error correction models from which stationarity might also be tested. 
Subject to the above caveats, the approach of Forni (2004) is followed to suggest that 
gasoline prices be proportional across the US and that this would confirm a broad market or a 
single market definition in US gasoline market, and thus determine a link to long-run 
arbitrage and efficiency. 
                                                     
11
 This result can be readily shown to apply when the underlying equations relate to the Dickey-Fuller 
test and it can be shown analytically that the intercept is the reverse coefficient and the coefficient on 
the lag level is the same irrespective of the way round the regression is run. 
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Hosken and Taylor (2004) in their extended discussion of Forni (2004) suggest 
results from stationarity test could deceive the market analyst under two conditions. Firstly 
when the two series respond to a single common shock and secondly when the original price 
series are both stationary. The former suggests that the analyst be aware of the impact of a 
small number of large shocks one indication of which is non-normality. While, the latter 
problem does not arise in relation to the data used here, but should be detected by testing the 
univariate series for stationarity. 
In addition to analysing the problem via the application of univariate stationarity tests 
the problem as compared with Forni (2004) is further analysed in a panel context. This is 
especially pertinent here as it might be imagined that the long-run characteristic of regional 
gasoline price series should have features in common. It would seem to make sense to 
compare the univariate analysis with a panel study. One feature that relates to price series is 
volatility and when the variance process is highly persistent then this may impact the extent to 
which the computed statistics obtain their asymptotic limit. Boswijk (2001) suggests that a 
maximum likelihood or least squares correction may be applied to the Dickey Fuller test 
when the mean and variance processes are independent. While Rahbek et al (2002) found that 
convergence to the asymptotic distribution might be relatively slow when the variance 
process has powerful autoregression. The same may not be the case were some extreme 
distributions selected to explain the data such as the Cauchy or stable Paretian distributions. 
3- DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
In this paper the stationarity properties of the US gasoline market is analysed using weekly oil 
price proportions across eight regions of the US: West Coast, Central Atlantic, East Coast, 
Gulf Coast, Lower Atlantic, Midwest, New England, Rocky Mountains. The sample starts in 
the first week of May 1993 to the first week of May 2010.
2
  
                                                     
2
 The number of observations is 900. The data have been obtained from energy information 
administration website (www.eia.doe.gov). The oil price series are all stationary in first difference of 
their natural logarithm or might be considered to be I(1) in the log price, results available from the 
authors on request. 
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To this end we test for the stationarity of the log price differential to determine the 
definition of the market to consider whether the market can be viewed as being efficient. The 
approach adopted in this research uses the ADF tests due to Dickey and Fuller (1979), the 
ADFGLS test of Elliot, Rothenberg, and Stock (1996) and where appropriate a GLS corrected 
ADF test to account for GARCH/ARCH (Beirne et al, 2007). The panel methods of Hadri 
(2000), and Im, Pesaran and Shin (2003) are used to support the univariate analysis. 
4- RELATION BETWEEN METHODOLOGY AND LITERATURE 
To measure market definition in the US gasoline market stationarity tests are applied to see 
whether there is a long-run dependence between prices of different market segments. Here 
univariate tests are used to examine whether a combination of log price differentials are 
stationary and the acceptance of the stationary behaviour of the series confirms consistency 
with the appropriate market definition. 
Finding inefficiencies in the long-run suggests that they relate to market failure rather 
than mistakes. Whereas arbitrage implies prices move to clear markets and that the market is 
efficient. Hence, firms prices should move in line or one firm’s price should react to the 
others. If one considers the time series model associated with the ADF test as a reduced form 
equation of relative price behaviour, then the residuals combine the demand and supply 
shocks associated with regional and national price movements once market adjustments are 
captured by the dynamics in the model that underlines the ADF test. Given the underlying 
non-stationarity of each price, then a stochastic trend explains the evolution of the shocks to 
each price series and the notion that the trend is common is encapsulated in the error 
correction term associated with the log price differential being stationary. The underlying 
econometric hypothesis in the long-run is theoretically consistent to what has been termed 
parallel pricing (Buccirossi, 2006). Forni (2004) suggests when stationarity is accepted for a 
number of sub-markets across a country then the market might be viewed as being broad. 
The early literature analysing prices considered the observation that they were 
correlated as a sign of collusive behaviour. While the literature that considers elasticity and 
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consumer loss often requires explicit modelling of demand and supply or cost (see Forni, 
2004). One might formulate a dynamic demand and supply systems when information is also 
available on quantities to compute price elasticities or some notion of consumer surplus, but 
with uncertainty over quality or price, then a more appropriate measure of loss is termed 
“Consumer Detriment”. Unfortunately, measures of detriment depend on some computation 
of average cost or the mark-up (Hunter et al, 2001). This leads Forni (2004) to suggest that 
the observation that finding arbitrage is indicative of a broad market provides an effective 
means to detect market failure and inappropriate pricing. 
[Figure 2 goes here] 
STATIONARITY 
The log of weekly spot prices for gasoline in West Coast, Central Atlantic, East Coast, Gulf 
Coast, Lower Atlantic, Midwest, New England, Rocky Mountains are denoted by pWC, pCA,  
pEC, pGC, pLA, pMW, pNE, and pRM. Figure 2 shows 28 combinations of the differentials in log
2
 
prices in the US between all the regions prices.  
As is explained below tests of stationarity applied to linear combinations of I(1) series 
relate to restricted cointegrating relations. Hence, the approach is efficient in terms of testing 
for a combination consistent with long-run efficiency as it fixes the intercept to zero and the 
slope to unity. 
Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) test:  
The Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) test (Dickey and Fuller, 1979) uses a parametric time 
series regression to eliminate serial correlation. The test is applied to a p
th
 order 
autoregressive model expressed in differences and levels: 
1
0 1 1
.
l
t t k t k tk
y y y   

 
         (1) 
Testing whether y is a stationary variable considers the proposition that 0.   The 
conventional regression assumptions are required for the model to be well formulated 
(Davidson and MacKinnon, 2004) and this is important for the correct formulation of the 
ADF test, under the null of non-stationarity (H0 : =0). Acceptance of the null implies that (1) 
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is a p-1
th
 order autoregressive model that relates to series that are stationary in first difference 
form. Accepting the one sided alternative hypothesis H1: <0 implies yt is stationary.  
To confirm that what we are really considering a form of cointegration it is useful to 
transform the model underlying the ADF test into a dynamic model in the differential in log 
prices: 
 
1
0 1 1 1
( ) ( ) ( )
l
it jt it jt k it k jt k tk
p p p p p p   

   
           (2) 
Alternatively, (2) might be better seen as an error correction model of ∆pit: 
1 1
0 1 1 1 1
( ) .
l l
it it jt k it k k jt k tk k
p p p p p    
 
    
            
Any application of a stationarity test to price proportions is also a test of whether the prices 
cointegrate with a long-run coefficient of unity. 
Dickey-Fuller GLS (DFGLS) test 
Elliot, Rothenberg, and Stock (1996) show that the ADF regression including a constant, or a 
constant and a linear time trend can be corrected for the effect of these variables via a 
preliminary regression. This gives rise to the adjusted model:  
1
1 1
.
ld d d
t t k t k tk
y y y  

 
          (3) 
Comparing this equation with (2), yt  has been replaced by a GLS corrected variable (  
  . The 
DF-GLS test is more efficient as it eliminates nuisance parameters plus it takes account of 
initial values that affect the test (Beirne et al, 2007). 
Kwiatkowski-Phillips-Schmidt-Shin (KPSS) 
Forni (2004) also applied the KPSS test in the analysis of regional data. The null associated 
with stationarity might be seen to correspond with natural justice so that the test is computed 
under the proposition that the gasoline market in the US is efficient.  
The model can be expressed in terms of a single equation for t=1…T: 
 yt = rt  + t.      (4) 
The underlying model breaks down into a random walk and an error component: 
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rt = rt-1 + ut   
where r0 is unknown, the ut are iid residuals across time. In general, 
2 0u   and the test is a 
variance ratio test 2 2/u     
with H0: =0  against H1: >0. 
Under the null 2 0u  and rt is constant and the Lagrange Multiplier (LM) statistic is 
based on the residuals from the following regression which we find convenient to specify for 
the i
th
 price proportion yit  related to a common exogenous variable xt: 
yit = b xt +it. 
The LM statistic derived under the assumption that the errors are iid is computed for the i
th
 
series using the following relation: 
2 2
1
*2
*2
1 1 1
1
                               
1
, ( ) 2 ( , )  and .
T
itt
i
i
t l T
it ij i o s s it it sj s t s
T S
LM
S e z l z e e
T

    

   

   

  
   
Where, 0 is the constant variance term, z=s/l+1 is the bandwidth, l is the lag truncation and 
s the autocorrelations that are weighted in the variance equation by the kernel ( , )l z . Here 
the Bartlett, Parzen and Quadratic Spectral functions are applied with different bandwidths. 
ANALYSIS OF THE TESTS UNDER THE ALTERNATIVE AND THE 
NULL OF STATIONARITY  
It can be seen from table 1, that the null hypothesis of the unit-root in ADF and DF-GLS tests 
on virtually all the log differential prices has been rejected at the 5% significance level and 
that suggest that the corresponding combinations are stationary. This is in contrast to the 
results of Forni (2004) where the alternative was often rejected at the 5% level. Rejection of 
the null indicates that the US defines a broad geographic market for gasoline.  These results 
suggest that the market is efficient as out of 28 tests it can be observed from table 1 that only 
in one case the Gulf Coast and the Lower Atlantic is stationarity rejected at the 5% level. 
[Table 1 goes here] 
It is an irony that rejection of stationarity occurs when the test is applied under that null as the 
KPSS test is significant in a number of cases so stationarity cannot be readily accepted. The 
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null of stationarity can only be accepted at the 5% level in the case of Central Atlantic and 
Mid West, Central Atlantic and West Coast, East Coast and Mid West, Gulf Coast and West 
Coast, Mid West and West Coast, New England and the Rockies. The West Coast defines the 
broadest market being integrated with the Central Atlantic, Gulf Coast and Mid West and at 
the 1% level New England. 
Finding a distinct or narrower market based on the analysis derived from the KPSS 
test in such regions contradicts the findings obtained from ADF and DF-GLS tests. There is 
some correspondence in these results with those of Forni (2004), except when the impact of 
the trend is considered.
 3
  
It has been suggested that the KPSS test performs poorly when the series are 
stationary, but the autoregressive coefficient is relatively large. While, Caner and Killian 
(2001) suggested that the KPSS test is not powerful especially in the light of possible moving 
average behaviour when compared with the ADF and DF-GLS tests. However, Forni (2004) 
found far less uniform results, though with many fewer observations observed at a lower 
frequency. Unlike Forni (2004) these results are consistent with the finding of a broad market 
when the ADF test can be relied on, but the results based on the KPSS test need to be viewed 
with some circumspection. 
PANEL TESTS OF THE NON-STATIONARY/STATIONARY NULL 
AND COHERENT UNIVARIATE TESTS 
In this section the problem is limited to a panel problem and a similar set of univariate tests. 
In the context of a system of error correction models then the analysis considers N price 
equations as arises when considering a vector autoregressive (VAR) model or a sequence of 
single equation error correction models. Forni (2004) provided good reasons as to why 
univariate methods were appropriate for testing long-run arbitrage. Neither the VAR nor the 
Engle and Granger (1987) procedure simultaneously tests for cointegration and the 
                                                     
3
 These findings may relate to cases where the notion of LEPT due to Hunter and Burke (2007) may better explain 
the stochastic trend than one series alone. This problem may arise when new information becomes fragmented 
across a number of price series; especially when related to less influential regions. 
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restrictions on the coefficients. Hence, testing parallel pricing and stationarity/cointegration is 
unified and this approach can be seen as being efficient. 
[Figure 3 goes here] 
A further issue that arises in the context of testing stationarity of real exchange rates 
relates to cross rates and triangular arbitrage (Smith and Hunter, 1985). This follows from 
selecting alternative base currencies to determine whether the real exchange rate is stationary. 
In the exchange rate case the sequence of results that arise from the underlying dynamic 
exchange rate models are dependent on each other when the different models are coherent 
(Hunter and Smith, 1982). A similar issue arises when testing stationarity of price proportions 
using equivalent dynamic models or might be viewed as choosing different regional prices as 
numeraire. Hence, ½N(N-1) price proportions relate back to N underlying price equations. To 
this end it has been decided to consider a smaller sub-set of prices, and base this on further 
information. The remaining analysis is undertaken paying attention to the US regional 
gasoline infrastructure represented in Figure 3 and as a result the following pairs of log price 
differentials are selected for further analysis: y1=log(PNew England/PMid-West), y2=log( PMid-
West/PCentral Atlantic), y3=log(PMid-West/PEast-Coast), y4=log(PLower Atlantic/PGulf Coast), y5=log(PMid-West/PGulf 
Coast), y6= log( PGulf Coast/PRocky Mountain), y7=log(PGulf Coast/PWest Coast), y8= log(PMid-West/ PRocky 
Mountain), y9= log(PRocky Mountain/PWest Coast).
 
 
The sequence of plots in Figure 4 considers all the selected price proportions. It 
would appear from visual inspection that y1, y2, y3 y6 and y9 are mean reverting and seemingly 
stationary, but y4 and y5 seem to exhibit upward and slight downward trends respectively and 
as a result appear non-stationary. While y7 and y8 do not have any apparent trend, but the 
behaviour may again appear closer to a random walk without drift and thus potentially non-
stationary.  
[Figure 4 goes here] 
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To further evaluate the argument in the above section the ADF, DF-GLS and KPSS 
test are applied to the log price differentials set out above and the results revealed in table 2.
4
 
According to these results it can be confirmed for the ADF and DF-GLS tests the null 
hypothesis of a unit root has been rejected in all cases apart from y4.  The analysis is similar to 
that considered before. However, the results for the KPSS tests in table 2 imply that the null is 
accepted at the 1% level for y2, y3, y7 and y8. However, it is still rejected at the 5% level in 
cases: y1, y4, y5, y6, y7 and y9.  
A further extension to the Forni method especially when the time dimension is 
limited might be to consider the panel tests due to Im et al (2003) and Hadri (2000). One 
reason for this might be to investigate the validity of the KPSS test and to this end the small 
sample corrected panel test due to Hadri (2000) is applied. 
[Table 2 goes here] 
It has been suggested that the panel case may yield improvements, because there may be 
benefits to pooling the data in the case where the series are strongly related. A panel approach 
has also been recently applied by Giulietti et al (2010) to analyse electricity prices for the UK. 
The Hadri Panel Unit Root Test 
The model underlying the panel version of the test under the null of stationarity can be 
expressed in terms of a single equation from a set of panel relations for t=1…T and i=1…N 
the dimension related to each region with 
 yi = XiBi + ei. 
Where, yi = [yi1…yiT], ei = [ei1…eiT] and Xi is a Tx1 unit vector or in the trend case includes 
both the unit vector and a trend. The LM test statistic is the panel version of the KPSS test 
considered above: 
  
1
1
.
N
u ii
LM LM
N 
 
 
 
                                                     
4
 There are ½N(N-1)=28 price proportions to analyse when the upper triangle of price correspondences are 
excluded; this is a further difference between our analysis and that of Forni. The combinations are further reduced 
to take account of lines of communication across the US. A further reason for this is that when comparison is made 
between these types of test and more conventional error correction model and cointegration studies, the 28 inter-
relations cannot be independent as they all derive from nine underlying dynamic price equations. 
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It is shown in Hadri (2000) for the panel version of the LM test that the following finite 
sample correction follows a standard normal distribution in the limit: 
      
 ( )
.u uu
u
N LM
Z



  
Hadri (2000) computes the Bartlett correction terms u=1/6 and u
2
 = 1/45. For T>50 Hadri 
(2000) provides evidence based on Monte Carlo simulation that shows that the empirical size 
of the test is approximately .054 and with  in the range [.1,] the test has maximum power. 
It is robust to non-normality and performance is not reliant on the size of the cross section. 
Results for the Hadri panel unit root test based on different bandwidth and kernel are 
presented in table 3. The test is compared with a one sided critical value at the 5% level of 
1.64, but only with the Parzen kernel for the longest bandwidth do we find that for 3 out of 
the eight cases considered can the null of stationarity be accepted. Hence, the Hadri results do 
not contradict those of the KPSS test.  
[Table 3 goes here] 
The size of a typical autocorrelation coefficient related to the ADF test statistic 
suggests the data are strongly autoregressive. The strength of this correlation explains why 
their behaviour might be seen to be distinct from the model underlying the KPSS test that 
considers a constant plus random component drive the series under the null as compared with 
the distance between the stationary and unit root case that arises with the ADF test. So the 
poor performance of the Hadri and KPSS tests may be symptomatic of strong or persistent 
autoregression and this may not be inconsistent with the suggestion by Caner and Killian 
(2001) that the KPSS test is particularly problematic when the error process is moving 
average (MA). One interpretation of the analysis of the lags might be that the long 
autoregression really relates to MA or ARMA behaviour. 
The Im, Pesaran and Shin Panel Unit Root Test 
For comparison with the panel unit root test under the null of stationarity the test due to Im et 
al (2003) is applied. The IPS panel unit root test estimates a mean adjusted ADF test statistic 
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that may also be corrected for fixed and random effects. Individual ADF tests are computed 
for within mean adjusted data and the t-tests computed accordingly. The t-bar test statistic is 
the average of the individual mean corrected ADF statistics compared with the critical values 
derived in the tables in Im et al (2003).The result of the IPS test are presented in table 4. 
[Table 4 goes here] 
In all cases for the panel the alternative of stationarity can be accepted at the 1% level and so 
on average the series are stationary (Beirne et al, 2007). Hence, the panel and univariate tests 
are consistent in terms of the stationary and non-stationary null. 
5- SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
Forni (2004) suggests that a broad market might be determined by a confirmatory analysis 
that follows from univariate stationarity tests based on the null and alternative of non-
stationarity producing a common conclusion. In this article, such confirmatory analysis only 
finds in one case that the market is narrow and that is for the potential relation between the 
Gulf Coast and the Lower Atlantic. 
In terms of finding a broad market based on the Forni approach that is here corrected 
so the lower triangle of results are defined by symmetry, then the ADF and KPSS results at 
the 1% level conclude that the West Coast defines the broadest market in association with the 
Central Atlantic, Gulf Coast, Mid West and New England and via symmetry the reverse 
applies. The Mid West defines a broad market with the Central Atlantic, East Coast and West 
Coast; while the Central Atlantic defines an extended market with the Mid West and the West 
Coast, and New England with the Rockies and West Coast. Furthermore prices all to respond 
to each other in the following cases: the East Coast and Mid West; the Gulf Coast and West 
Coast; and the Rockies and New England. 
Here the analysis was extended to include panel tests and following a similar analysis 
of exchange rates by Beirne et al (2007) we conclude that when the majority of univariate unit 
root tests and panel stationarity tests accept the alternative of stationarity, then the conclusion 
to be drawn is that on average the series are stationary. This arises when the ADF tests are 
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considered as eight out of the nine univariate tests accept the stationary alternative as does the 
IPS test for a panel of eight price proportions. So on average when the ADF tests are to be 
accepted, there is a broad market as in the long-run these price ratios are stationary; the tests 
based on autoregressive models appear able to distinguish between the highly persistent 
behaviour related to a random walk as compared with powerful autoregression. 
If a similar approach is considered for the tests under the null of stationarity this 
corresponds in the case of regulation and competition to natural justice. However, the KPSS 
test results suggest that on average the price series are non-stationary as the null is rejected in 
five out of nine cases. While the panel test of Hadri with N>1 provides very little support that 
the market is broad. Notice that individual price series are characterized by ARCH style 
volatility, strong serial correlation and non-normality and as a result the tests under the null of 
stationarity may not be well disposed to distinguish between strong autoregressive behaviour 
and a unit root as the process under the null is subject to the intercept just white noise. In 
relation to the panel form of the test, Hlouskova and Wagner (2006) provide evidence that it 
may over-reject the null hypothesis when there is powerful serial correlation, but their results 
relate to a small sample across time. Hadri (2000) suggests that this test is robust to non-
normality and the correspondence between the value of the KPSS and Bartlett corrected test 
would suggest that normality might not be an issue for 900 observations. However, neither 
the Hadri nor the KPSS test is corrected for ARCH and strong ARCH has been shown to 
affect the rate of convergence of the Johansen trace test based on the VAR even with a sample 
of 1000 observations and powerful volatility described by the spectral radius of the ARCH 
polynomial (Rahbek et al, 2002). 
If there is significant doubt in relation to the stationarity test or where there is further 
evidence of localized market power and collusion, then this would suggest that further 
concentration of ownership of gas stations or refining capacity should be rejected in regions 
where the stationary null in terms of price proportions is called into question. 
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Figure 1- Gasoline Taxes across the US
5
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2- Plot of log price differential in CA, EC, GC, LA, MW, NE, RM, WC 
Note: Representing plots of log differential in prices of gasoline in CA, EC, GC, LA, MW, NE, RM, WC; Y1= log (PCA)- log 
(PEC), Y2= log( PCA)- log (PGC ), Y3= log (PCA)- log (PLA), Y4=log (PCA)- log (PMW), Y5= log (PCA)- log (PNE),  Y6= log( PCA)- log 
(PRM), Y7= log (PCA)- log (PWC),  Y8= log (PEC)- log (PGC), Y9= log (PEC)- log (PLA), Y10= log (PEC)- log (PMW), Y11= log( PEC)- log 
(PNE), Y12= log (PEC)- log (PRM) , Y13= log( PEC)- log( PWC), Y14= log( PGC)- log (PLA), Y15= log (PGC) log- log( PMW), Y16= 
log( PGC)- log (PNE), Y17= log (PGC)- log (PRM) , Y18= log ( PGC)- log( PWC), Y19= log (PLA)- log (PMW), Y20= log( PLA)- log (PNE), 
Y21= log (PLA)- log (PRM) , Y22= log (PLA)- log ( PWC), Y23= log (PMW)- log (PNE ), Y24= log (PMW)- log (PRM) , Y25= log ( PMW)- log 
(PWC) , Y26= log (PNE)- log (PRM), Y27= log (PNE)- log (PWC) , Y28= log (PRM)- log (PWC). 
                                                     
5
 The above diagram was obtained from www-static.shell.com. 
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Figure 3- Map of US regional gasoline infrastructure6 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4- Plot of gasoline log price differential in different regions of US based on the 
regional gasoline infrastructure 
  
                                                     
6
 The above diagram was obtained with permission of the National Association of Convenience Stores, from the 
2012 NACS Retail Fuels Report. 
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Table 1- Summary of ADF tests, DF-GLS tests and KPSS tests on the log differential of 
gasoline prices - with intercept and no trend. 
                                         
      -3.724537** 
(-3.706698**) 
[3.452390**] 
-6.171970** 
(-1.990969*) 
[0.915151**] 
-4.989478** 
(-4.707481**) 
[4.902073**] 
-4.928462** 
(-2.335932*) 
[ 0.446911] 
3.829677** 
(-3.747953**) 
[5.438980**] 
-4.541653** 
(-3.167151**) 
[1.165679**] 
-5.441773** 
(-5.411565**) 
[0.267441] 
       -4.080439** 
(-1.077737) 
[ 4.317563**] 
-4.648051** 
(-3.939956**) 
[2.451975**] 
-4.721538** 
(-2.055378*) 
[0.182702] 
-3.700019** 
(-3.640446**) 
[7.843325**] 
-4.011872** 
(-3.121466**) 
[2.022444**] 
-4.808598** 
(-4.800208**) 
[0.749265**] 
        -2.222776 
(-0.303123) 
[3.431025**] 
 
-3.360986* 
(-2.815583**) 
[1.681035**] 
 
-5.177154** 
(-1.868563) 
[ 0.861199**] 
 
-6.013833** 
(-5.089623**) 
[4.908352**] 
 
-3.784865** 
(-2.275466*) 
[0.378705] 
 
         -3.870944** 
(-2.352104*) 
[0.962882**] 
-3.838434** 
(-3.636543**) 
[4.868950**] 
-3.917549** 
(-3.512071**) 
[2.318920**] 
-4.068736** 
(-4.051737**) 
[ 0.921917**] 
          -3.805266** 
(-2.132938*) 
[1.493587**] 
-4.430335** 
(-4.251056**) 
[2.443409**] 
-4.741388** 
(-3.287946**) 
[0.253900] 
           -5.436560** 
(-3.795707**) 
[0.365536] 
 
-5.108161** 
(-5.030299**) 
[ 0.542706*] 
            -5.814599** 
(-4.529151**) 
[1.036716**] 
             
Note: Values without the brackets presents ADF/OLS t-statistic, values in ( ) shows DF-GLS/OLS t-statistic, and values in 
[ ] indicates KPSS LM-statistic. ADF test critical value at 1% level is -3.437483 and at 5% level is -2.864578. DF-
GLS test critical values at 1% level is -2.567566, at 5% level is -1.941180. The KPSS test critical value at 1% level 
is 0.739, at 5% is 0.463. ** Significant at the 99% confidence level, and* at the 95% confidence level.  
 
 
 
 
Table 2- Summary of ADF tests, DF-GLS tests and KPSS tests on the log differential 
of gasoline prices (with intercept and no trend) 
 
Log price differential ADF/ 
OLS t-statistic 
DF-GLS/ 
OLS t-statistic 
KPSS 
LM-statistic 
X1(25)
 7
   -3.805266 * -2.526560 * 
 
1.038708** 
 
X2(25)
 
 -4.928462 * 
 
-2.335932 * 
 
0.413221 
 
X3(25) -4.721538 * 
 
-2.055378 * 
 
0.166735 
 
X4(23) -2.222776 
 
-0.303123 
 
2.866131** 
 
X5(20) -5.814599 * 
 
-4.52915* 
 
0.887255** 
 
X6(16) -3.360986* 
 
-2.81558* 
 
 1.226137** 
 
X7(20) -5.213816* 
 
-3.99106* 
 
 0.635492* 
 
X8(24) -3.784865** 
 
-2.275466* 
 
 0.323487 
 
X9(16) 
-4.430335* 
 
-4.251056* 
 
 2.443409** 
 
Note: ADF Test Critical value at 1% is -3.44, at 5% is -2.86.  DF-GLS test Critical value at 1% is -2.57, at 5% is -
1.94. KPSS test Critical value at 1% is 0.74, at 5% is 0.46. * Significant at the 95% confidence level and ** 
significant at the 99% confidence level.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
7
 Using the same process as was presented in the previous section the lag orders have been selected via inspection 
of the correlogram. For the nine price differentials yi(j), then (j) represents the lag order. 
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Table 3- panel unit root test based on different bandwidth and kernel with individual 
intercept 
 Kernel Z-Statistic with 
max lag 
bandwidth I 
P-value Z-Statistic 
with3xmax lag 
bandwidth 
P-value Z-Statistic with 
long 
bandwidth 
P-value 
X1(25) X2(25) Bartlett 7.01801 0.0000 3.39543 0.0003 3.16228 0.0008 
 Parzen 7.97431 0.0000 4.28954 0.0000 1.67134 0.0473 
 Quadratic 
spectral 
6.15763 0.0000 2.77395 0.0028 4.54125 0.0000 
X9(16) X7(20) Bartlett 12.3978 0.0000 6.36771 0.0000 3.16228 0.0008 
 Parzen 14.3860 0.0000 7.83900 0.0000 1.62509 0.0521 
 Quadratic 
spectral 
10.4138 0.0000 5.17141 0.0000 4.34528 0.0000 
X9(16) X6(16)   Bartlett 19.0721 0.0000 9.56826 0.0000 3.16228 0.0008 
 Parzen 21.7708 0.0000 11.3763 0.0000 1.68960 0.0456 
 Quadratic 
spectral 
16.2368 0.0000 7.84960 0.0000 4.19906 0.0000 
X4(23)  X8(24)   Bartlett 7.99594 0.0000 3.51012 0.0002 3.16228 0.0008 
 Parzen 9.86467 0.0000 4.18272 0.0000 1.59771 0.0551 
 Quadratic 
spectral 
6.55805 0.0000 2.78203 0.0027 5.00252 0.0000 
X5(20)  X8(24)   Bartlett 4.18928 0.0000 2.09300 0.0182 3.16228 0.0008 
 Parzen 4.93103 0.0000 2.41350 0.0079 1.63134 0.0514 
 Quadratic 
spectral 
3.39104 0.0003 1.66684 0.0478 5.66465 0.0000 
X3(25) X6(16)     Bartlett 6.14625 0.0000 2.53044 0.0057 3.16228 0.0008 
 Parzen 7.44649 0.0000 3.28497 0.0005 1.74157 0.0408 
 Quadratic 
spectral 
5.22775 0.0000 1.94076 0.0261 5.35815 0.0000 
X1(25) X2(25) Bartlett 17.4965 0.0000 8.36028 0.0000 6.70820 0.0000 
X3(25)  X4(23) Parzen 20.3252 0.0000 10.3208 0.0000 3.53917 0.0002 
X5(20) X6(16) 
X7(20)  X8(24) 
X9(16) 
Quadratic 
spectral 
14.8680 0.0000 6.78183 0.0000 9.75988 0.0000 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4- Im, Pesaran and Shin Unit Root Test with individual intercept 
Log differential price IPS/ 
OLS t-statistic 
P-Value 
X1(25) and X2(25) -4.55156 0.0000 
X9(16) and X7(20) -5.62423 0.0000 
X9(16) and X6(16)   -3.81476 0.0001 
X4(23)  and X8(24)   -2.34972 0.0094 
X5(20)  and X8(24)   -4.58201 0.0000 
X3(25)  and X6(16)   -4.01161 0.0000 
X1(25), X2(25),X3(25), X4(23), 
X5(20),X6(16), X7(20), X8(24), X9(16) 
-8.04934 0.0000 
The selected lag number for each pair is equal to the maximum lag order within the series.  
 
